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INTRODUCTION

An innate tension exists between the goals of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA') 1 and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("Bankruptcy Code").2 One of the most
significant goals of ERISA is to preserve and protect pension benefits for the retirement security of American workers.3 By contrast,
one of the primary goals of the Bankruptcy Code is to create a fair
and equitable system for recompense to creditors, while discharg* Vice President and Chief Counsel, Insurance, at Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association - College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA - CREF). A.B. College of
Mount St. Vincent; L.L.B. Fordham Law School.
1 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
2 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
3 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994). The Act states that "the continued well-being
and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by
these [ERISA-governed] plans," and that it is therefore desirable that "safeguards be
provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of such
plans." Id.
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ing debtors from their debts.4 Obviously, the inclusion of a
debtor's pension benefits in the debtor's bankruptcy estate is of
great interest to creditors. Conversely, the ability to preserve retirement assets is of primary concern to the debtor.
At the outset, it is helpful to examine Guidry v. Sheet Metal
Workers NationalPensionFund,' a nonbankruptcy case, to set the
stage for consideration of the conflicting goals of ERISA and the
Bankruptcy Code. In Guidry, the United States Supreme Court
decided that Curtis Guidry, the chief executive officer of a labor
union local who had embezzled more than $377,000 from the
union, was entitled to receive his union pension benefits with no
offset for his embezzlement. 6 The Court decided that the union's
effort to impose a constructive trust on Guidry's pension fund benefits until the union was "made whole for its losses" 7 was inappropriate, based on ERISA's section 206(d) prohibition of assignment
or alienation of benefits.8 Section 206(d), the Court reasoned, reflects a congressional policy decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners and their dependents-who may be blameless-even if this prevents others from securing relief.9
Clearly, ERISA's section 206(d) anti-alienation and assignment provision is a pivotal factor in determining whether a plan
participant's pension benefits can be protected from the reach of
creditors in personal bankruptcy proceedings. When bankruptcy
trustees seek to reach these pension interests on behalf of creditors, the key issue under the Bankruptcy Code is whether a given
set of restrictions on transfer and debtor access is sufficient to exclude the restricted assets from the bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2) of the Code. 10
4 See generally S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 989 (1978) (discussing goals
of the Bankruptcy Code).
5 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
6 Id. at 371-74.
7 Id. at 368 n.5.
8 Id. at 376; see 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1985 & Supp. 1990) ("Each pension plan
shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or
alienated.").
9 Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376. Guidry left open the question of whether a different
result would be reached if a fiduciary breached a duty to the plan itself. Id. at 372-73;
see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Solmensen, 743 F. Supp. 125, 129 (E.D.N.Y.
1990) (recognizing exception to anti-alienation provision where fiduciary breached
duty to pension plan itself).
10 See Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
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The general rule under the Bankruptcy Code is that a bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor
in property as of the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case." 1
This general rule is applicable "notwithstanding any provision...
that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the
debtor."12 Section 541(c)(2), however, provides that a "restriction
on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that
is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is [also] enforceable in a case under [the Bankruptcy Code]." 13 In other
words, a property interest that falls within section 541(c)(2)'s
blanket exception is excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy estate.
14
At the same time, the Bankruptcy Code, in section 522(d)(10)(E),
provides for a limited exemption of particular pension benefits to
the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and
dependents. This article will examine the applicability of these
exemptions to debtors' pension plan assets.

11 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
12 Id. § 541(c)(1)(A).
13 Id. § 541(c)(2) (emphasis added).
14 Id. § 522(d)(10)(E). Section 522(d)(10)(E) exempts from a debtor's bankruptcy
estate "[t]he debtor's right to receive a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death,
age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and any dependent of the debtor." Id. Section 522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code, however, grants to each state the authority to use its own exemption statutes
for its citizens rather than § 522(d). Id. § 522(b)(1); see Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d
159, 162-63 (6th Cir.) (examining congressional prerogative allowing states to opt out
of federal scheme), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983). Thus, debtors in states that have
opted out are not protected by the § 522(d)(10)(E) exemption.
Thirty-five states have opted out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions in favor of
their own exemption schemes, which generally do provide exemptions for annuity income. The 35 states that prohibit their respective citizens from electing the federal
exemptions contained in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming.
David M. Landis & Jon E. Kane, ERISA Exemptions in Bankruptcy: A Logical Solution, 66 Am. Bankr. L.J. 253, 254 n.3 (1992).
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THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT RULING IN
PATTERSON V. SHUI
ATE

A. Pre-Pattersonv. Shumate Circuit Court Cases
The United States Supreme Court's June 15, 1992 decision in
Patterson v. Shumate'- provided considerable protection to debtors who participate in corporate pension plans that are tax-quali16
fied under section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC")
and also subject to ERISA. Specifically, the Court held that a
debtor's interest in such a plan does not become property of the
bankruptcy estate,"7 and thus is protected from creditors' claims
in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.'
Prior to Shumate, the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had determined that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" in section 541(c)(2) referred only to state spendthrift trust
laws.' 9 The anti-alienation provisions of ERISA standing alone,
therefore, did not provide a basis for exempting the debtor's pension benefits from the bankruptcy estate.20 The Second and Seventh Circuits reached the same conclusion on other types of retirement programs which, although not subject to the anti-alienation
and assignment provisions of IRC section 401(a)(13) 2 1 and ERISA
section 206(d)( 1),22 contained contractual anti-assignment provisions.23 Courts adopting these approaches turned to an analysis
of whether the debtors' retirement programs were analogous to
15 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
16 I.R.C. § 401(a) (1988).
17 112 S. Ct. at 2248.
18 See generally Jeffrey R. Houle, Patterson and its Progeny: ERISA-Qualified

PensionPlans as Propertyof the Bankruptcy Estate after Patterson v. Shumate, 8 ME.
B.J. 298 (1993).
19 See, e.g., Reed v. Drummond, 951 F.2d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113

S. Ct. 314 (1992); Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke), 943 F.2d 1435, 1443 (5th Cir. 1991);
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Watson (In re Kincaid), 917 F.2d 1162, 1165-66

(9th Cir. 1990); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490
(11th Cir. 1985), superseded by statute, as stated in In re Gherman, 101 B.R. 369, 371
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th

Cir. 1984).
20 See, e.g., In re Dyke, 943 F.2d at 1441 (citing In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.
1983)).
21 I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988). This section states, in part: "A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which such trust is a part
provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." Id.
22 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
23 See Morter v. Farm Credit Servs., 937 F.2d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2991 (1992); Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 82 (2d Cir. 1982).
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spendthrift trusts and thus excludable from their bankruptcy estates. The Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits concluded
that the ERISA-governed retirement plans were not valid spendthrift trusts for one of two reasons. First, if the participant created the plan, it was a self-settled trust which could not be a
spendthrift trust (often the courts were reviewing so-called "Keogh" or "HR-10" plans established by self-employed individuals for
themselves and their employees).2 4 Second, the debtor may have
exercised too much control over the extent and timing of distributions under the plan, i.e., the debtor could obtain lump-sum distributions or plan loans.2 5
On the other hand, some courts treated tax-qualified pension
plans as equivalent to spendthrift trusts for purposes of exclusion
from a bankruptcy estate. The Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits held that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in
section 541(c)(2) included ERISA-governed plans, based on either
ERISA's section 206(d)(1) anti-alienation and assignment provision or IRC's section 401(a)(13) anti-alienation and assignment
provision or both coordinate anti-alienation and assignment provisions (which must be included in each tax-qualified plan, except
for certain governmental and church plans).2 6 The Ninth Circuit
found that a 401(k) plan that provided for loans and withdrawals

24 See Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). Keogh or HR-10
plans are retirement plans for self-employed individuals established pursuant to the
Keogh-Smathers Act, Pub. L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962) (codified in scattered
sections of the IRC). See In re Dyke, 943 F.2d at 1443 (holding that self-settled trusts
cannot be spendthrift trusts under Texas law).
25 See In re Reed, 951 F.2d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 314
(1992); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488, 1489-90 (11th Cir. 1985) (superseded by statute, as stated in In re Gherman, 101 B.R. 369 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989)); In re Graham,
726 F.2d 1268, 1269 (8th Cir. 1984). But see Morter, 937 F.2d at 358 (pension plan was
spendthrift under state law); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d at 1450, (state law allowed debtor
to exempt pension plan from bankruptcy estate); In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162, 1168
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that 401(k) plan which provided for loans and hardship withdrawals was spendthrift under state law).
26 See, e.g., Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 1991); Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 364 (4th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992); Forbes v. Lucas
(In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 959 (1991); Gladwell v.
Harline (In re Harline), 950 F.2d 669, 674 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2991 (1992); Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1479-80 (4th Cir. 1990);
In re Messing, 114 B.R. 541 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990), aff'd, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1585 (1992); see also 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988) (IRC
section requiring non-alienation provision); 29 U.S.C. § 1052(d)(1) (1988) (requiring
non-alienation provision in ERISA plans).
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was analogous to a spendthrift trust under state law.2 7 Additionally, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits determined that state laws allowing debtors to exempt tax-qualified plans from their bankruptcy estates were not preempted by ERISA.28
The conflicting results in the various courts of appeals made
the matter ripe for Supreme Court review. Fortunately, a case
involving a tax-qualified, ERISA-governed pension plan was the
first granted review by the Court.
B. Analysis of Patterson v. Shumate
The debtor in Patterson v. Shumate,29 Joseph B. Shumate,
Jr., was employed for more than thirty years by the Coleman Furniture Corporation ("Coleman")Y0 Eventually, he became Coleman's controlling shareholder, president, and chairman of the
board. 1 Shumate participated in the Coleman pension plan,
which satisfied all of the requirements for ERISA applicability
and tax-qualified status under the IRC, including the anti-alienation and assignment provisions of both statutes. 2 Eventually,
both Coleman and Shumate encountered financial difficulties. 3
In 1982, Coleman commenced a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceed34
ing, which was converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.
Subsequently, Shumate commenced his own Chapter 7 proceeding
to liquidate his personal assets and obtain a discharge of his personal debts. 5 The Coleman bankruptcy trustee liquidated the
Coleman pension plan and made full distributions to all participants except Shumate, who had managed the plan.3 6 Thereafter,
Shumate and his bankruptcy trustee, Patterson, sought to recover
27 In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1168. But see Reed v. Drummond, 951 F.2d 1046,
1050 (borrowing by sole participant from tax-qualified plan indicated sufficient lack of
restriction on funds to disqualify'plan as spendthrift trust) vacated, 113 S. Ct. 324
(1992) (9th Cir. 1991).
28 See Checkett v. Vickers (In re Vickers), 954 F.2d 1426, 1429 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 4 (1992); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d at 1450; NCNB Texas Natl Bank v.
Volpe (In re Volpe), 943 F.2d 1451, 1452-53 (5th Cir. 1991).
29 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
30 Id. at 2245.
31 Id.
32 Id.

33 Id.
34 112 S. Ct. at 2245.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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Shumate's interest in the Coleman pension plan. 37 The two actions were consolidated
in the U.S. District Court for the Western
38
District of Virginia.

The district court was faced with deciding whether Shumate's
interest in the pension plan was property of the bankruptcy estate
or whether it should be distributed to him in full. The court held
that ERISA was not "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under section 541(c)(2); therefore, the plan's ERISA-mandated anti-alienation provision was not enforceable in bankruptcy and the interest
was part of the bankruptcy estate. 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision,4" holding that ERISA did constitute "applicable nonbankruptcy law" and that the anti-alienation provision in the pension plan effectively excluded Shumate's
interest in the plan from the bankruptcy estate.4 1 Patterson appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.42 The
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision, agreeing that ERISA constitutes a type of "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" contemplated by section 541(c)(2), and that
interests in ERISA-governed plans are therefore excluded from
bankruptcy estates.4 3
The Court based its ruling on the plain language of
541(c)(2).'" It rejected the argument that the reference to "applicable nonbankruptcy law" encompassed only state law, and construed the statutory language as embracing federal law as well.45
The Court noted that this broader construction of the phrase comports with other references in the Bankruptcy Code to sources of
law, and that when Congress intended to refer only to state law, it
37 Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 83 B.R. 404 (W.D. Va. 1988), rev'd sub
nom Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
38 Shumate, 112 S. Ct. at 2245.
39 Creasy, 83 B.R. at 406. The court held that "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
under Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2) referred to state law. Id. Therefore, in order to
qualify under the exclusion, the pension plan had to qualify as a valid spendthrift
trust under state law. Id. The court found that Shumate retained too much control
over the pension plan, including the ability to terminate the plan and receive lump
sum payments. Id. at 408-09.
40 Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2242
(1992).
41 943 F.2d at 364.
42 Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 932 (1992).
43 Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246-47 (1992).
44 Id. at 2246-47.
45

Id.
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did so explicitly.46 Thus, the Court found that Congress must
have intended the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to include any applicable nonbankruptcy law, including federal law
such as ERISA.4 7
The Court next determined that the anti-alienation provision
in the Coleman pension plan was enforceable under section
541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 48 According to the Court, the
anti-alienation provisions called for by ERISA and the IRC clearly
impose "restriction[s] on the transfer of a debtor's 'beneficial interest' in the trust."4 9 Coleman's plan complied with these requirements and therefore contained a "restriction on the transfer" of
the debtor's "beneficial interest" in the plan. 50 This restriction
was "enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law" because a
plan trustee was required by ERISA to discharge its duties "in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan."5 1 Therefore, the Court held that the debtor's interest in the
Coleman pension plan was excluded from the bankruptcy estate
by the plain language of section 541(c)(2).52
Furthermore, the Court rejected the bankruptcy trustee's argument that application of the section 541(c)(2) exclusion to pension plans would render superfluous the explicit exemption for
pension benefits in section 522(d)(10)(E) of the Bankruptcy
Code.
Section 522(d)(10)(E) provides for an exemption of payments under a pension or similar plan to the extent "reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor."54 The Court concluded that this exemption covers a significantly broader array of interests than simply tax-qualified pension plans subject to ERISA and excluded under section
541(c)(2). 5 Thus, interests in non-tax-qualifiedplans such as section 403(b) annuity plans and IRAs, as well as interests in nonERISA-governed plans such as governmental plans and certain
church plans, which would generally be included in the bankId.; see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1988) (electing exemptions controlled by
"the state law that is applicable to the debtor").
47 Shumate, 112 S. Ct. at 2246-47.
48 Id. at 2247-50.
49 Id. at 2247.
5o Id.
51 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1988)).
52 112 S. Ct. at 2248.
53 Id. at 2248-49.
54 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988).
55 Shumate, 112 S. Ct. at 2249.
46

1994]

PROTECTING PENSION ASSETS

417

ruptcy estate because they do not contain enforceable anti-alienation provisions, might nevertheless be exempt to some extent
under section 522(d)(10)(E) based on a "needs" analysis.5 6 The
Court found, therefore, that its interpretation of the section
541(c)(2) exclusion did not render the section 522(d)(10)(E)
"needs" exemption superfluous.- 7
Finally, the Court noted that even if bankruptcy law is principally concerned with making a broad range of the debtor's assets
available to creditors, 58 the exclusion of qualified pension plan interests from the estate furthers two other important policy goals:
(1) it assures the same treatment for pension interests irrespective of whether the debtor is in bankruptcy; 5 9 and (2) it ensures
uniform national treatment of pension plan interests, instead of
subjecting them to the vagaries of state spendthrift trust laws.6
The Supreme Court's rationale in Shumate should also be extended to non-ERISA, tax-qualified pension plans and ERISA-governed, non-tax-qualified pension plans.6 1 If a pension plan is not
subject to ERISA because, for example, it is a governmental pension plan, but is a tax-qualified pension plan under IRC section
401(a) or section 403(a), then the debtor's interest could be excluded based on the IRC section 401(a)(13) anti-alienation and assignment provision. (Note, however, that this provision is not
technically required to be included in a tax-qualified governmental pension plan.) Similarly, if a pension plan is subject to ERISA,
but is not tax-qualified under the IRC because, for example, it is a
section 403(b) annuity plan, then the debtor should be able to rely
on ERISA's section 206(d) anti-alienation and assignment
provision.
56

Id.

57 Id. at 2248-49.

58 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988) (bankruptcy estate is comprised of "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case").
The Court, however, notes that "petitioner mistakes an admittedly broad definition of
includable property for a 'policy' underlying the Code as a whole." Shumate, 112 S.
Ct. at 2249.
59 Id.; see Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (commenting that
"[u]niform treatment of property interests 'prevents' a party from 'receiving a windfall
merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy'" (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat'l
Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961))).
60 Shumate, 112 S. Ct at 2249-50; see Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S.
1 (1987) (construing "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to include ERISA, so that pension rights would not be determined by state spendthrift trust law).
61 See infra notes 66-81 and accompanying text (discussing recent Seventh Circuit case concerning non-tax-qualified government pensions).
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C. Legislative Initiatives
The Supreme Court's decision in Shumate left unresolved the
issue of whether non-tax-qualified pension plans, e.g., 403(b) annuities and IRA's, which are also not subject to ERISA (such as
governmental pension plans and certain church pension plans)
can also be excluded from the participant-debtor's bankruptcy estate. This unresolved issue was addressed by Senate Bill 1985, a
comprehensive bankruptcy bill introduced by Senators Howell T.
Heflin (D-AL) and Charles E. Grassley (R-IA) on November 19,
1991. The bill would have excluded from bankruptcy estates some
non-tax-qualified pension plan accumulations, such as section
403(b) annuity plans, section 408(k) Simplified Employee Pensions ("SEPs"), section 414(d) governmental pension plans, and
section 457 deferred compensation plans. 62 During the closing
days of the 102d Congress, however, the pension protection provisions were stripped from the bill, primarily because the Judiciary
Committee had not consulted with the Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee. The Senate passed the stripped-down bill
by a vote of ninety-seven to zero.
On March 10, 1993, Senator Heflin introduced Senate Bill 540
entitled the "Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1993," which included many of the provisions that were cut from the original
bill.63 This comprehensive bankruptcy bill proposed a new section, 541(c)(3)(A), to exclude from a debtor's bankruptcy estate the
assets and benefits accumulated pursuant to a pension, profitsharing, stock bonus or other plan qualified under IRC section
401(a), 403(a), 403(b) or 408(k), or a governmental plan under IRC
section 414(d) or 457.64 This exclusion would not apply to the extent that contributions were made in excess of IRC section 401(k),
401(m), or 415 limits on plan contributions. 65

62 See S. 1985, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
63 S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CoNG. REC. S2618 (1993). The Employee
Benefits Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, which has
led efforts to amend the federal Bankruptcy Code, supports S. 540.
64Id.
65 139 CONG. REC. S2619 (1993). In its June 17, 1993 comment letter, however,
the Employee Benefits Committee supported interposing a one-year "look back rule"
for such excess contributions.
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PLANS

A. Analysis of the Seventh Circuit'sDecision in Morter v. Farm
Credit Services
Shumate did not address the bankruptcy treatment of nontax-qualified public pension plans that do not contain strict antialienation provisions. The Seventh Circuit, however, did rule on
such a plan in Morter v. Farm Credit Services. 66 The Supreme
Court denied the creditor's petition for certiorari, thereby leaving
intact the Seventh Circuit's holding that the noncashable
teacher's retirement annuity contract accumulations at issue were
excluded from the participant-debtor's bankruptcy estate under
section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, and that these accumulations were not to be afforded dissimilar treatment in bankruptcy
proceedings.
In this case the debtor, Raymond Lione Morter, had been a
professor at Purdue University for more than thirty years.6
Under the school's mandatory retirement policy, Professor Morter
was forced to retire in 1990 at age seventy. 69 As a condition of his
employment, Morter had participated in Purdue University's governmental retirement plan, which was funded with Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America/College Retirement
and Equity Fund ("TIAA-CREF") noncashableretirement annuity
contracts.70 All TIAA and CREF retirement annuity contracts contain strict anti-alienation provisions.7 1 Under Purdue's plan, the
employer paid 2all pre-retirement contributions on Professor
7
Morter's behalf

When he filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition pursuant to
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code,73 Professor Morter listed his
66 937 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2991 (1992).
67 Id. at 359.
68 Id. at 355.
69 Id.
70 Id.

The TIAA-CREF plan provided funding for the retirement programs of
more than 500,000 employees in over 3000 universities and colleges. Id.; see Peters v.
Wayne State Univ., 476 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Mich. 1979), rev'd, 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir.
1982).
71 Morter, 937 F.2d at 355. The TIAA contract specifically provides that "[any
assignment or pledge of this contract or of any benefit hereunder will be void and of no

effect." Id.; see Connick v. Teacher's Ins. & Annuity, 784 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir.) (annuitant may not reach assets of TIAA-CREF plan until retirement and then only as set
forth in plan), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986).
72 Morter, 937 F.2d at 355.
73 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1978).
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interest in the retirement plan as exempt. 74 The Farm Credit
Services of Madison, Wisconsin and the United States bankruptcy
trustee objected to this claimed exclusion.7 5
In determining whether the noncashable pension accumulations should be excluded from Morter's bankruptcy estate, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the "proper inquiry under section
541(c)(2), then, is not whether the accumulated funds are in a
'traditional' spendthrift trust, but whether the retirement plan
bars the beneficiary and his creditors from reaching the funds. If
it does, the plan is tantamount to a spendthrift trust under state
law" 7 6 and is thus excludable from the bankruptcy estate. The
court emphasized Morter's lack of access to the funds and his employer's expectations as the plan's sole funder in imposing this restriction on access.7 7 In fact, under the plan Morter would not
have any access to the accumulations until retirement, and then
only as set forth in the plan.7 8 Because of its approach to section
541(c)(2), and its determination that the contractual anti-alienation provisions were enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcy
law," the court excluded the TIAA and CREF accumulations from
Morter's bankruptcy estate.7 9
This holding, that qualified pension plan accumulations will
be excluded from the participant-debtor's bankruptcy estate under
section 541(c)(2), is certainly preferable for debtors, as opposed to
a finding that the accumulations are includablein the bankruptcy
estate, subject only to the "needs test" exemption of section
522(d)(10)(E). A blanket exclusion under section 541(c)(2) enables
the pension plan to: (1) avoid having to participate in the bankruptcy proceedings in order to explain the kinds of benefits available, and being subject to investigations as to the amounts reasonably necessary for the future support of the debtor and the
debtor's dependents under the section 522(d)(10)(E) exemption;
and (2) avoid potentially inconsistent results among bankruptcy
cases involving plan participants, depending upon the participants' levels of need to support themselves and their dependents.
74 937 F.2d at 356.

75 Id.
76

Id. at 358.

Id. at 358-59. The court determined that this retirement plan was not selfsettled because plan participation was a condition of employment and the debtor's
employer was the sole contributor. Id. at 358.
78 Id. at 358; see supra note 71.
79 937 F.2d at 358-59.
77
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The Morter decision required a finding that the pension accumulations were exempt under nonbankruptcy law.80 The state law
exemptions, unlike the anti-alienation provisions of a tax-qualified plan or an ERISA-governed plan, are far from uniform and
may be subjected to constitutional and public policy challenges. 8 '
In addition, trends toward legislative constraint of these exemptions are emerging, e.g., the imposition of monetary caps similar
to the section 522(d)(10)(E) cap or other "needs tests"). Such
trends need to be monitored if the Bankruptcy Code is not
amended to exclude pension funds.
Because a governmental plan is not subject to the ERISA section 206(d) anti-alienation and assignment provision,82 and because a section 403(b) annuity plan is not subject to the IRC section 401(a)(13) anti-alienation and assignment provision, neither
fits squarely within the holding of the Supreme Court in Patterson
v. Shumate.
It is arguable, however, that a section 403(b) annuity is also
subject to a "restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of
the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law" within the meaning of section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. IRC section 401(g) provides that for purposes of sections 401, 402, 403, and 404 of the Code, the term "annuity" does
not include any contract or certificate issued after December 31,
1962, which is transferable,if owned by any person other than the
trustee of a section 401(a) tax-qualified trust.8 3
Treasury Regulation 1.401-9(b)(1)(i) provides that an annuity
contract will receive section 403(b) tax treatment only if it satisfies the requirements of section 401(g) and regulation 1.401_9.84

Satisfaction of regulation 1.401-9 requires that annuity contracts
expressly contain the provisions that make the contract nontransferable within the meaning of regulation 1.401-9(b)(1)(i). 5 In
the case of a group annuity contract, the restrictions on transferability must apply to the participant's interest under the contract,
80 Id. at 358 (pension plan accumulations exempt if "plan is tantamount to a
spendthrift trust under state law").
81 See Robert A. Johnson, Bankruptcy-In Re Moore: Moore Confusion on Excluding ERISA PensionPlansfrom the Bankruptcy Estate by Code Section 541(C)(2), 16 J.
CoRp. L. 575 (1991).
82 See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (1988).
83 I.R.C. § 401(g) (1988).
84 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-9(b)(1)(i) (1963).

85 Id.
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e.g., the certificate issued to the employee, rather than to the em8 6
ployer's interest under the group annuity contract as a whole.
An annuity contract is transferable if the owner can transfer any
portion of his interest in it to any person other than the contract's
issuer. Thus, an annuity contract is transferable:
[I]f the owner can sell, assign, discount, or pledge as collateral for
a loan or as security for the performance of an obligation or for
any other purpose his interest in the ...

contract to any person

other than the issuer thereof. On the other hand, for purposes of
section 401(g) ....
[an] annuity contract is not considered to be
transferable merely because such . . . contract, or the plan of

which it is a part, contains a provision permitting the employee
to designate a beneficiary to receive the proceeds of the ...

con-

tract in the event of his death, or contains a provision permitting
the employee to elect to receive a 87
joint and survivor annuity, or
contains other similar provisions.
Treasury Regulation 1.401-9(c), Example (1), sets forth an example of the P Employees' Annuity Plan which is funded by individual annuity contracts issued by the Y Insurance Company. According to Example (1):
Each annuity contract issued by such [insurance] company after
December 31, 1962, provides on its face, that it is "NOT TRANSFERABLE." The terms of each such contract further provide
that, "This contract may not be sold, assigned, discounted, or
pledged as collateral for a loan or as security for the performance
of an obligation or for any other purpose, to any person other
than this company." The annuity contracts of the P Employees'
Annuity Plan satisfy the requirements of section 401(g) and this
section. 88
Because the section 401(g) nontransferability requirements
attaching to post-1962 section 403(b) annuity contracts do significantly restrict the employee-participant's ability to transfer a beneficial interest in the contract, section 401(g) should arguably
serve to exclude a section 403(b) annuity contract from the participant-debtor's bankruptcy estate under Bankruptcy Code section
541(c)(2). 9
86

Id. § 1.401-9(b)(1)(ii).

87
88

Treas. Reg. § 1.401-9(b)(3) (1963).
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-9(c) (Ex.1) (1963).

89 It should be noted, however, that the participant-debtor's ability to transfer
funds from one § 403(b) annuity contract to another § 403(b) annuity contract (or to a
§ 403(b)(7) custodial account) might be construed by the courts to undermine the pro-
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It will be interesting to see if future courts consider section
401(g) in analyzing whether a participant-debtor's interest in a
section 403(b) annuity contract should qualify for exclusion from
the debtor's bankruptcy estate under Bankruptcy Code section
541(c)(2). It is more probable, however, that in the case of nonERISA, non-tax-qualified section 403(b) annuity contracts, the
courts will look to applicable state laws.
B.

Impact of Cashability

It is not clear whether cashability will ultimately negatively
affect non-tax-qualified public pension plan accumulations in
bankruptcy proceedings. Currently, in order to be excluded from
the bankruptcy estate, non-tax-qualified public pension plan accumulations must be analogous to "spendthrift trusts" and exempted
by applicable nonbankruptcy law.9 0 Spendthrift trusts limit the
access of beneficiaries to accumulations. Thus, plans with
cashability provisions may be unable to successfully assert that
they are analogous to spendthrift trusts so that they can rely on
the section 541(c)(2) bankruptcy estate exclusion.
The courts clearly take a negative view of participant-debtor
access to pension accumulations. 91 Courts often include the
debtor's interest in pension funds to which the debtor has access
in the bankruptcy estate, often forcing pension plans to participate in the bankruptcy proceedings to explain the plan benefits,
participant access, and other details. These proceedings are
costly, time-consuming, and unpleasant processes in which plan
participants run the risk of losing pension accumulations. The
plans themselves run the risk of inconsistent results, adverse tax
consequences, and disgruntled participants.
Two Indiana cases illustrate the courts' lack of tolerance for
92
participant access to pension accumulations. In In re VanMeter,
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Indiana found the most significant test under Morter to be "the
tection afforded by the nontransferability restrictions mandated by § 401(g). See Rev.
Rul. 90-24, 1990-1 C.B. 51.
90 See, e.g., Morter v. Farm Credit Servs., 937 F.2d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 2991 (1992); In re VanMeter, 137 B.R. 908, 910-11 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1992).
91 See infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text (discussing courts' disfavor of
participant access to pension accumulations).
92 137 B.R. 908 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992).
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extent of access to the plan and who has that access. 93 The VanMeter court looked favorably upon decisions that found a termination of employment requirement for cashability insufficient to support exclusion of the pension accumulations from the bankruptcy
estate.9 4 In sum, the court implied that it would not exclude accumulations cashable only upon termination of employment, because such access defeats the analogy to those spendthrift trusts
for which section 541(c)(2) was designed. 95
Another Indiana decision further illustrates the courts' negative attitude toward cashable accumulations. In In re Garvin,9 6
the bankruptcy court held that an expansive Indiana exemption 97
for pension accumulations was unconstitutional for, inter alia, being too broad and not requiring limited access.98 The Garvin court
cited an Oklahoma court's review of that state's exemption, in
which the court asserted that a blanket exemption "heedlessly demolishes" the traditional public policy disfavoring trusts that allow participant access to accumulations. 99
A further issue in exemption law is the question of what happens to plan proceeds once they move from the pension plan into
the possession of the participant-debtors themselves. A recent
nonbankruptcy case is informative. In Auto Owners Insurance v.
93 Id. at 910 (quoting Morter, 937 F.2d at 358). The VanMeter court held that the
proper inquiry under § 541(c)(2) was not whether the funds were in a "traditional"
spendthrift trust, but whether the plan bars the beneficiary and his creditors from
reaching his funds. Id.
94 Id. at 910-11. The court stated that it would be "inequitable and unfair" to
creditors to permit exclusion of a debtor's plan interest "and the day after she receives
her discharge enable her to terminate her employment and receive the whole amount
... " Id. at 911; see Employee Benefits Comm. v. Tabor, 127 B.R. 194 (S.D. Ind. 1991);
In re Cress, 121 B.R. 1006, 1012 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990); In re Cook, 43 B.R. 996 (N.D.
Ind. 1984). The VanMeter court commented that even if quitting one's job to gain
access to the accumulations is considered extreme and unlikely, "in a true spendthrift
trust there is no possible voluntary action a beneficiary can take which would initiate
an early termination of the trust or invasion of the corpus." 137 B.R. at 911.
95 137 B.R. at 911.
96 129 B.R. 598 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1991).
97 The Indiana state law exemption essentially provides that an interest a judgment debtor has in a pension fund, a retirement fund, an annuity plan, or any similar
fund, either private or public, is not subject to levy or sale on execution or any other
final process. See IND. CODE § 34-2-28-1(a)(6) (Supp. 1990).
98 Garvin, 129 B.R. at 603-04.
99 Id. at 602-03 (quoting In re Garrison, 108 B.R. 760 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989)).
TIAA-CREF had a similar experience with its cashable supplemental retirement annuity contracts under North Carolina law. See Richardson v. TIAA-CREF, 123 B.R.
540 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (holding that cashable retirement annuities could not be exempted from bankruptcy estate as matter of public policy).
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Berkshire, 0 0 the Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that if the participant-debtor continues to hold and use funds distributed by the
plan for support, the exemption statutes will continue to mandate
their exemption. 1 1 Conversely, if the debtor takes a lump-sum
distribution and reinvests it, the purpose of the exemption statutes-to support the debtor and dependents and prevent them
from becoming public wards-is not being satisfied and the funds
will not be exempted. 10 2 Funds not being used for support will lose
their exempt status. 0 s Thus, exempt funds in the bank accounts
of the debtor retain their status as long as they retain the "quality
of moneys." 0 4 Since recent legislative initiatives fail to deal with
this issue, cases such as Berkshire may provide a basis for similar
litigation under the Bankruptcy Code.
C. Treatment of Other Plans
Keogh or HR-10 plans are tax-qualified plans established by
self-employed individuals for themselves or their employees.' 0 5 As
tax-qualified plans, Keogh plans are required to include the Code
section 401(a)(13) anti-alienation and assignment provision. To
the extent that Keogh plans cover common-law employees, they
will normally be subject to ERISA and its section 206(d) antialienation and assignment provision. Hence, Keogh plan accumulations are probably protected under the reasoning of Pattersonv.
0 6
Shumate.1
IRC section 408(a) individual retirement accounts, and section 408(b) individual retirement annuities (collectively "IRAs"),
are essentially self-settled. 10 7 IRAs are non-tax-qualified, do not
restrict alienation,10 8 and permit total distribution on demand
subject only to tax penalties. As a result, they are deemed includ100 588 N.E.2d 1230 (IlM. Ct. App. 1992).
101 Id. at 1233.
102
103

Id.
Id.

104 Id. (citing Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973); Porter v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 370 U.S. 159 (1962)).
105 See Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87792, 76 Stat. 809 (codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
106 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. But see Bernstein v. Greenpoint
Sav. Bank (In re Lane), 149 B.R. 760 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting creditors access to $400,000 of assets in two Keogh plans maintained by dentist).
107 See I.R.C. § 408(a)-(b) (1988).
108 IRAs are specifically excluded from ERISA's anti-alienation requirement. See
29 U.S.C. § 1051(6) (1988).
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able in a participant's bankruptcy estate by case law.' 0 9 In fact,
IRAs would not even qualify for exclusion under the proposed
Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(3)(A) in the 1993 version of
Senate Bill 540.110 Under the theory articulated in Shumate,
however, they might nevertheless be exempted under section
522(d)(10)(E) subject to proof of the needs of the debtor and his
dependents."' Several courts have held that the debtor's interest
in an IRA becomes the property of the bankruptcy estate," 2 unless it is a so-called "rollover IRA."" 3 SEPs under section 408(k)
of the Code have been afforded similar treatment. Proposed
Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(3)(A), however, would exclude
4
SEPs from a participant's bankruptcy estate."
CONCLUSION

The 1990 Supreme Court decision in Guidry set the stage for
the use of ERISA section 206(d) to preserve and protect pension
benefits by disallowing the imposition of a constructive trust on
the debtor's pension benefits. Today, all pension plan participants
benefit greatly from the 1992 Supreme Court decision in Patterson
v. Shumate, where the Court clearly balanced two significant competing goals in favor of the non-alienation of retirement accumulations. Additionally, plan administrators of tax-qualified or ERISAgoverned plans can relax, no longer threatened with having to
choose between disobeying turnover orders from the bankruptcy
courts and possible tax disqualifications by the I.R.S. Finally,
Shumate has given Congress a strong incentive to further amend
the Bankruptcy Code to expressly extend the pension benefit exclusion to non-ERISA plans, such as governmental plans and certain church plans, and to certain non-tax-qualified plans, such as
section 403(b) annuities and rollover IRAs.

109 See In re Damast, 136 B.R. 11, 18-20 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991).
110 See S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. Rlc. S2618 (1993).
111 See Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2249 (1992) ("§ 522(d)(10)(E) exempts from a bankruptcy estate a much broader category of interests than
§ 541(c)(2).").
112 See Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Kramer, 128 B.R. 707
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991).
113 Compare In re Mann, 134 B.R. 710 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (exempting proceeds of debtor's qualified Keogh plan from estate when deposited in "rollover" IRA)
with In re Iacono, 120 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) (including debtor's IRA in
estate under New York exemption law).
114 See S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REC. S2618 (1993).

